The trend in insolvencies shows a clear and consistent pattern. From the beginning of 2022 there is a steady build-up, which accelerates in 2023 and peaks around the middle of 2024. A clear reversal follows from February 2024: the number of insolvencies declines and stabilizes in 2025 at a level roughly comparable to that of 2022. With this, the acute bankruptcy wave seems to be over.

However, this decline must be put into perspective. The decline does not mark a return to economic calm, but the end of an exceptional corrective phase. What is becoming visible is a transition from broad systemic shock to a phase of selective pressure.

From delayed pain to catch-up failures

The increase in 2022 and 2023 is largely explained by the removal of support measures and the normalization of market conditions after the pandemic. Companies that remained afloat during the crisis thanks to liquidity support, low interest rates and accommodating payment arrangements faced the reality of rising costs, declining margins and tightened financing conditions starting in 2022.

In 2023, inflation, wage increases and higher interest rates amplified these pressures. Companies with weak balance sheets, structurally low profitability or high dependence on external financing proved especially vulnerable. This resulted in accelerated outflows from companies that had been economically underwater for some time.

Stabilization is not recovery

The decline from 2024 does not mean that the corporate sector has become collectively stronger. On the contrary, current bankruptcy levels are still structurally higher than in the years before 2022, and volatility remains significant. The market has become less forgiving.

What we see is not a recovery but a new reality in which financing is more expensive, payment terms are used longer as a liquidity tool and margins remain under pressure. Companies that are not structurally equipped for this will remain vulnerable even if the overall number of insolvencies stabilizes.

Selective pressure replaces mass dropout

Instead of a broad bankruptcy wave, a phase of selective pressure is now emerging. No longer entire sectors, but specific business models, chain positions and balance sheet structures determine who stays afloat. Companies with weak debtor portfolios, limited pricing power or high fixed costs are disproportionately at risk.

For credit management and risk management, this means that historical averages and sector labels provide less guidance. The risk is no longer in the masses, but in the details. Especially in a phase of stabilization, vigilance is crucial: the rate of bankruptcies may be declining, but the underlying vulnerability has not disappeared.

Unequal distribution

The stabilization in the overall number of bankruptcies masks a fundamental imbalance beneath the surface. The distribution across sectors is clearly skewed. A limited number of sectors remain structurally dominant in the bankruptcy picture, while others show only occasional or temporary spikes.

In particular, sectors Construction (F) and Wholesale and Retail Trade (G) account for a disproportionate share of the total throughout the period. These sectors show not only high levels but also strong volatility, indicating continued structural vulnerability rather than temporary aftermath. The development in the Lodging, Food and Beverage Services (Hospitality) sector (I) shows a different, but explainable pattern. This sector experienced a clear peak in bankruptcies just after the corona period.

Why exactly these sectors?

The structural dominance of F, G and I is no accident. These sectors share a number of characteristics that make them especially sensitive in the current economic climate.

The construction industry (F) is hit by high fixed costs, lengthy project cycles and limited flexibility in price agreements. At the same time, staff shortages and higher financing costs put additional pressure on liquidity. As soon as one project or client slows down, this directly affects the entire chain.

In wholesale and retail (G), margins are thin and dependence on volume is high. Cost increases in logistics, rent and personnel can only be passed on to the end customer to a limited extent. Moreover, the sector often acts as a buffer in the chain: suppliers and financiers feel payment pressure in the trade rather than at the end customer.

In Hospitality (I), during the pandemic, much of the pressure was artificially cushioned by support measures. After these were removed, it turned out that some of the companies had insufficient recovery capacity. It is notable that the hospitality sector has shown slight flattening in the most recent period. This may indicate that some of the vulnerable businesses have since dropped out and that the remaining businesses have adapted better to the new cost structure.

However, bankruptcies are still higher on average than in 2023. This is partly because this sector combines several risk factors: high personnel costs, seasonality, limited price space and a strong dependence on consumer confidence. Small shocks in demand or costs here quickly have a disproportionate effect on continuity.

Conclusion: structural vulnerability

The data confirm a clear shift from broad systemic shock to selective pressures. In 2022 and 2023, firms in almost all sectors were hit by external factors such as cost increases, interest rate hikes and the unwinding of support measures. By 2025, that picture has changed.

Bankruptcies are now concentrated in sectors with clear risk profiles:

• high fixed costs;
• heavy reliance on labor;
• low margins;
• limited ability to pass on price increases.

This explains why the national aggregate level is stabilizing, while stress in specific sectors remains as high as ever. For risk management and credit management, this means that generic market indicators have less predictive value. The real risks are not in the average, but in sector and chain dynamics.